ISSN: 3067-2392
Research Article

Planetary Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities Research

Impact of Sound Corporate Governance Practices on Firm Performance: A Study on Some Select Indian Companies

Shubha Ranjan Dutta*

Assistant Professor of Commerce, Shibpur Dinobundhoo Institution (College) Howrah, West Bengal, India

***Corresponding author:** Dr Shubha Ranjan Dutta, Assistant Professor of Commerce, Shibpur Dinobundhoo Institution (College) Howrah, West Bengal, India. Tel No: 8777303113.

Submitted: 17 June 2024 **Accepted:** 25 June 2024 **Published:** 29 June 2024

https://doi.org/10.63620/MKPJSSHR.2024.1002

Citation: *Dutta, S. R. (2024). Impact of Sound Corporate Governance Practices on Firm Performance: A Study on Some Select Indian Companies. Planetary J Soc Sci & Hum Res, 1(2), 01-10.*

Abstract

The research employs 147 non- financial companies in India as a sample to examine how various corporate governance practices (such as board size, board diversity, board independence, frequency of board meetings, and CEO duality) affect firm performance. The study period is 13 years starting from 2011-12 to 2023-24. Adopting the static panel structure (Fixed Effect model), the findings reflect an affirmative association amidst a range of corporate governance practices and firm performance. This research theoretically contributes by adding new evidence from an intriguing market like India to the existing body of work. Practically speaking, the study's conclusions would assist the stock exchange regulators and other regulatory agencies in strengthening board management in improving firm performance.

JEL: *G3, G30, G32, G34, G38*

Keywords: Board Size, CEO Duality, Firm Performance, ROA, Tobin's Q

Introduction

Recently, corporate governance has received due attention both in developed and developing economies. Several studies have been conducted considering the influence of corporate governance on various firm-specific characteristics like firm size, capital structure, firm performance and firm's profitability [1-4] However, there is a lack of studies to address the impact on firm performance of corporate governance practices. Better corporate governance practices generally can safeguard the interest of stakeholders against the expropriation of insiders and promote corporate transparency, monitoring and control thereby triggering an improvement in firm performance. Consistent with this, the bid-ask spread is modest in countries where shareholder's rights are well protected (Jain, 2003). Corporate governance can influence firm performance by imposing strong surveillance on managers, restricting them from suppressing information. In this way, a strong and effective governance system can enhance transparency in the stock market leading to enhanced performance by depressing informational asymmetry.

The term 'corporate governance' has become one of the buzzwords used in case of global business. Sound corporate governance system in a company minimizes risk, provides access to global financial markets, showing transparency and ultimately intensifies firm performance.

On the contrary, sustainable value has become more and more important in respect of all the companies throughout the globe. Strategically, value creation is the ultimate goal of every firm. So, value creation and sustainability of such value have become the principal motto that every firm should try to attain. Sustainable value is closely connected with firm performance. If a company is able to attain sustainable value, then it should try to enhance firm performance by means of strong monitoring system, reducing agency costs, providing access to financial markets and showing transparency.

In this comprehensive framework, this study sheds light on the influence of corporate governance practices on firm performance in case of Indian companies. In doing so, this study adds several novelties to the existing literature. First, the present study seeks to examine the nexus among board size, board diversity, board independence, frequency of board meetings, CEO duality and firm performance in the Indian context. In doing so, the current

study adds several novelties to the existing literature. First, this is one of the few studies to investigate the link among board size, board diversity, board independence, frequency of board meetings, CEO duality and firm performance in India. Second, prior research has focused on either time-varying attributes or a cross-sectional approach. By investigating the panel structure, the current study fills in the gap. Third, the present study has been conducted considering a sample of top 147 NSE-listed non-financial companies with the intent to capture the comprehensive view of best blue-chip companies along with the mid-cap companies in India. Fourth, in practical terms, the findings of this study would be beneficial for the stock market regulators and corporate managers in devising plans and policies and other future courses of action. Different regulatory bodies and corporate managers should try their level best to perform good corporate governance practices (CGP) so as to intensify firm performance. Lastly, in today's global competitive world, managing sustainable value he come a challenging task for corporate managers, stock market regulators and others. This study will be helpful for different regulatory bodies and others in devising appropriate plans and policies in managing sustainable value of Indian firms so as to intensity firm performance.

The remaining portion of the paper is organized as follows: The survey of available literature and hypothesis of the study are presented in Section 2. The data and sample, research variables, and method are all defined in Section 3. Section 5 concludes the study, with section 4 providing the results and comments.

Survey of Literature and Hypothesis Development

From a theoretical standpoint, various ideas have emerged to investigate the connection between corporate governance practices and the performance of firms. Agency theory and Resource Dependency theory are two of the most popular.

Managers are viewed as agents of the company's principal (the owner) according to the agency theory proposed by Fama and Jensen and Meckling [5, 6]. The principal's (owner's) ability to keep tabs on the manager's (agent's) actions is compromised when the company's size increases. The rational, self-interested, and opportunistic nature of humans is assumed in agency theory. Under these assumptions, the manager is more likely to act in his or her own self-interest than the organization's. Due to information asymmetry, a potential conflict of interest can exist between a company's owner (principal) and manager (agent) when the latter has access to more detailed knowledge about the former's business dealings. Agency costs have a negative impact on firm performance.

The American academics Jeffrey Pferrer and Gerald Salancik created the resource dependency theory in 1978. The primary premise of this approach is that a company's resources are its greatest asset. Power of board of directors depends on the control and access over those resources. Board of directors should develop proper strategies in order to maintain open access to resources so as to intensify firm performance.

Board Size and Firm Performance

The agency theory states that a larger board of directors leads to better company performance since more eyes are keeping a close watch on things. A larger board, according to the resource dependency hypothesis, also means more expertise and experience in a wider range of fields. Companies with larger boards have more connections to influential people in their field and related fields. Since various directors have access to diverse resources, company performance improves as the number of directors increases.

Kalsie and Shrivastav conducted research to establish a connection between the size of a company's board of directors and its financial performance [7]. Findings from this study corroborate the agency and resource dependency theory's prediction that a larger board is associated with better company performance.

Based on the discussion above and the determined objective, the following hypothesis is made:
H1A: Board Size (BS) influences firm performance in an affirmative way.

Board Diversity (BD) and Firm Performance

Women's representation on corporate boards is essential for a healthy corporate governance system. Female board members are more likely to regularly attend meetings and pay close attention to board meetings and supervising performance and others [8-10]. Additionally, as compared to men, women tend to be more cautious, self-assured, and risk- averse. Female board members bring unique skills that can improve decision-making and bolster oversight, both of which can boost a company's performance.

The following hypothesis is formulated based on the above discussion and objective:
H2B: A more diverse board is associated with improved firm performance.

Board Independence and Firm Performance

Directors who are not part of a company are considered independent. They never allow bias to influence their governance decisions. They are entrusted with the duty of safeguarding shareholder interests via vigilant oversight. Appointing such directors is beneficial for a company since they bring with them a higher level of expertise and experience [11]. There is some evidence that companies with independent directors do better [12-14]. By keeping an eye on things, these outside directors can keep agency costs down and boost the company's performance [15].

The following hypothesis is made on the basis of the above discussion and objective settled:
H3C: Board Independence (BI) has a positive influence on firm performance.

Frequency of Board Meetings and Firm Performance

An affirmative association exists in between corporate board meeting frequency and company performance being identified by Al-Daoud et al. in their analysis of companies trading on the Amman Stock Exchange [16]. This is consistent with the findings of Brick & Chidambaram, who found that when board members meet regularly to discuss and engage one another on operational issues, they improve both the decision-making process and the firm's performance [17]. Similar to, Mangena and Pike encountered a significant positive association across the frequency of board meetings and the performance of companies listed on the Zimbabwe stock exchange floor [18-22].

There are a number of expenses associated with board meetings, including managers' time, travel costs, and directors' meeting fees. There may be further upsides, such as more time for board meetings, strategy development, and managerial oversight. If "firms have fewer board meetings than necessary, overemphasizing costs," then the frequency of board meetings will have a positive linkage with "firm value." Evidence suggests that holding more frequent meetings is an inexpensive way to increase productivity and the value of a business. If, on the other hand, benefits are overemphasized, board meetings will have a negative impact on company value. A negative connection between the number of board meetings held each month and company performance was identified by Vafeas [23].

The following hypothesis is made based on the above discussion and objective settled:
H4D: Frequency of Board Meeting (FBM) positively influences firm performance.

CEO Duality and Firm Performance
Since a dual board leadership arrangement hinders the board's ability to effectively regulate management, it is counterproductive and should be avoided [24]. In line with this, Duru et al. revealed a significant negative link between CEO Duality and business performance in their analysis of US firms [25].

A company's performance suffers when its chairman also acts as its chief executive officer (a situation known as "CEO duality"). To the contrary, if the CEO and chairman each had their own distinct responsibilities, stakeholders could meet with the CEO to tell about their grievances, the CEO would then inform the chairman of these issues, and the chairman would do what he could to solve them, leading to better decision making and ultimately lead to better performance for the company.

CEO duality may aggravate the agency problem and increase the information asymmetry between the firm's insiders and outsiders, both of which are detrimental to the firm's performance [26, 27]. Similarly, Hsu et al. discovered a robust inverse link between CEO duality and company performance in the backdrop of higher information costs in their analysis of Taiwan-listed companies [28]. The results fit with the agency hypothesis as well as the stewardship hypothesis. Pham et al. investigated the influence of CEO duality on Vietnamese companies [29]. The findings suggested that CEO duality could improve firm performance throughout the owing to the unity of presented command, as predicted by stewardship theory. However, agency theory argues that CEO duality is detrimental to company performance at the maturing stage because it compromises the CEO's ability to be monitored and controlled.

The following hypothesis is formulated based on the above discussion and objective settled:
H5E: CEO duality (CEOD) has a positive influence on firm performance.

Research Design

Data and Sample
The "Capitaline" database, a secondary source, has been employed as the basis for the database used in this investigation. The study will focus on the top 150 non-financial companies listed on India's National Stock Exchanges (NSE). The goal in making this choice is to obtain a representative cross- section of Indian firms, both large and medium in size while minimizing any potential sectoral biases in our sample. The study period is from April 1, 2011, to March 31, 2024; however, three companies are left out due to differences in their fiscal years. Finally, 147 firms make up the total sample size. The sample will be chosen no later than March 31, 2021.

Research Variable
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q, a popular market-based indicator that takes operational efficiency into account, has been used to assess a company's performance. Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value of equity + book value of all debt to book value of all assets at a given moment [30-32].

Independent Variable: More specifically, five factors have been considered, each of which reflects a different aspect of corporate governance practices (Board size, Board diversity, Board independence, Frequency of Board meetings, and CEO duality).

The determination of each independent variable is given below:

a) Board Size (BS) =Natural log of total number of directors on the board at period t [33, 34]

b) Board Diversity(BD) $\frac{\text{Number of women directors on the board at period } t}{\text{Total number of directors on the board at period } t}$ [35, 36]

c) Board Independence (BI) = $\frac{\text{Number of independent directors on the board during period } t}{\text{Total number of directors on the board during period } t}$
[14, 35]

d) Frequency of Board Meetings (FBM) = Number of board meetings held at period t
[14, 38]

e) CEO's Duality (CEOD) = DUALITY = Coded '1', ifBoard's Chairman acting as a CEO/Managing Director simultaneously and Coded '0', otherwise
[14, 39]

Control Variable: The study has taken firm size represented by natural logarithm of annual sales figure as a control variable [40, 41].

Model Specification
The effect of board size (BS), board diversity (BD), board independence (BI), board meeting frequency FBM), and CEO duality (CEOD) on company performance as measured by Tobin's Q is investigated. The following empirical model is constructed to test and validate the research's hypothesis:

$$Tobin'sQ_{it} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 BS_{it} + \beta_3 BD_{it} + \beta_4 BI_{it} + \beta_5 FBM_{it} + \beta_3 CEOD_{it} + \beta_7 FS_{it} + \mu_{it} \ldots \text{Model (1)}$$

Where i (company) = 1, 2...147 and t (time) = 1, 2,3,4,..,12. The above equation is written as per the pooled OLS model. Accordingly, the regressors are assumed to be non-stochastic. Furthermore, if the regressors are found to be stochastic, they are uncorrelated with the error term (μ_{it}).

The Breusch Pagan test and the F test have been run to compare the pooled OLS model with two potential models for panel data: the random-effect model and the fixed-effect model. Significant (unreported) estimates for both the BP and F tests indicate the need for panel data models, such as the random-effect model and the fixed-effect model, respectively. The Hausman test has been run to narrow down the options between the fixed-effect and random-effect models. The fixed-effect model passes the Hausman test and is therefore retained for further study.

Data Analysis

Summary Statistics

The descriptive statistics for all of the variables in this investigation are presented in Table 1. There are a total of 1764 observations across all variables, representing full firm years. BS has a statistically significant range (mean value = 2.343; Std. Dev. = 0.253) between 1.098 and 2.995. The distribution of BD values is (mean value =.086; Std. Dev. = 0.078) and (range =0.002–.428). The average value of a BI is 0.515, with a range from -0.003 to 1.000. Data for FBM show a range of 3.000–19.000 (mean value =5.416; Std. Dev. = 1.688). Statistics for CEOD indicate a range from 0 to 1 (mean value = 0.513, Std. Dev. = 0.500). TQ values can be found from 0.001 and 1573.211, with a mean of 6.564. FS often falls in the range of 158.570 to 516681.600, with a mean of 22595.720.

Table 1:

	TQ	BS	BD	BI	FBM	CEOD	FS
Mean	6.564	2.343	0.086	0.515	5.416	0.513	22595.720
Std. Dev.	62.598	0.253	0.078	0.152	1.688	0.500	60450.710
Minimum	0.001	1.098	0.002	0.003	3.000	0.002	158.570
Maximum	1573.211	2.995	0.428	1.000	19.000	1.000	516681.600
Observation	1764	1764	1764	1764	1764	1764	1764

Source: Authors' tabulation

Notes: Table 1 shows the definition and measurement of variables.

Table 4.2 Panel-Unit Root Test

Table 2 displays the outcomes of Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root tests for model (1) variables

The null hypothesis of this test represents that the series contains a unit root, and the alternative states the series is stationary. Every variable's Levin-Lin-Chu adjusted t-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level. As a result, we can conclude that the chosen variables are stationary at level, rejecting the null hypothesis in the process.

Table 2: Panel unit-root Test

Variable	Adjusted t- statistic
TOBINS'Q	-0.0001 *
BS	-11.3071 *
BD	-14.5391*
BI	-14.9397*
FBM	-14.7562*
CEOD	-23.3879*
FS	-0.0001*

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on STATA output

Notes: This table presents the Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test results of variables used in the model (1).
* indicates statistical significance at the 1% level

Testing the Multicollinearity

The outcomes of tests for multicollinearity for the model's explanatory variables (1) are shown in Table 3. Board Size (BS), Board Diversity (BD), Board Independence (BI), Frequency of Board Meetings (FBM), and CEO Duality (CEOD) all have maximum VIF values below the threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 1995), at 1.0400, 1.0600, 1.0600, 1.2900, and 1.2200, respectively. This shows that there is no problem with multicollinearity among the variables. The correlation matrix, displayed in Table 4.3, provides further confirmation of this finding.

Table 3: Testing the Multicollinearity

Variable	VIF	I/VIF
BS	1.0400	0 .9637
BS	1.0600	0.9419
BI	1.0600	0.9404
FBM	1.2900	0.7752
CEOD	1.2200	0 .8190

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on STATA output

Notes: This table presents the multicollinearity test results of explanatory variables used in the model (1).

Correlation Analysis

Table 4 displays the Pearson's correlation matrix showing the strength of associations between the target variable, namely firm performance (TQ), and the explanatory variables, namely Board Size (BS), Board Diversity (BD), Board Independence (BI), Frequency of Board Meetings (FBM), CEO Duality (CEOD), and the control variable, namely total assets of a firm representing Firm Size (FS). The data suggest a positive association in between Board Size (BS), Board Diversity (BD), Board Independence (BI), Frequency of Board Meetings (FBM), CEO Duality (CEOD) and Firm Performance (TQ). Tobin's Q, a measure of the performance of a business, appears to be strongly associated with firm size (FS), as calculated by the natural logarithm of total assets. Importantly, the control and independent variables' correlation coefficients should fall within the threshold of 0.80 (see Gujrati, 1995). This allows us to rule out the possibility of multicollinearity between variables in the examined model.

Table 4 Correlation Matrix

Variables	Tobin's Q	BS	BD	BI	FBM	CEOD	FS
Tobin's Q	1.000						
BS	0.068*	1.000					
BD	0.052	0.036	1.000				
BI	0.033*	-0.70*	-0.011	1.000			
FBM	0.058	-0.009	-0.082*	-0.085*	1.000		
CEOD	0.050	0.052	-0.064*	-0.093*	0.049	1.000	
FS	0.037	0.168	0.049	-0.225*	0.041	0.65*	1.000

Source: Authors' tabulation

* 1 % Level of Significance ** 5 % Level of Significance

Regression Results

Table 5 presents the estimates for our baseline model (Model 1). Applying the fixed-effects regression model (as suggested by the Hausman test given in Table 5), the results show that Board Independence (BI) and frequency of board meetings (FBM) maintain a significant and positive relationship with firm performance (coefficient = 400.03; p-value = 0.003 & coefficient = 541.00; p-value =0.004), indicating that with the increase in the proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors, firm performance enhances. Further, board size (BS) and board diversity (BD) also bear a significant and positive association with firm performance (coefficient = 450.01; p value =0.001 & coefficient = 560.02; p value =0.002) suggesting that increase in corporate board size and conducting regular board meetings will boost firm performance. Furthermore, board diversity (BD) and CEO duality appear to have a significant and positive association with firm performance. Concerning the control variable, firm size (FS), as measured by natural logarithm of total assets has a positive and significant influence on firm performance (TQ).

Table 5 Regression results

Variable	FE
BS	450.01*
	(0.001)
BD	560.02*
	(0.002)

BI	400.03* (0.003)
FBM	541.0* (0.004)
CEOD	67.767* (0.003)
FS	98.235* (0.004)
Constant	100.105 (0.320)
R^2 : Within Between Overall	0.0234 0.0058 0.0097
F-Statistic	24.810*
Wald chi2(8)	
Hausman Test chi2(7)	21.540*
N	1764

Note: * denotes 1 % Level of Significance, ** denotes 5 % Level of Significance and p values are reported in the parenthesis

Robustness Check

To validate the estimates of the baseline model as reported in Table 5, the said model has been re- estimated (Model 2) by using return on assets (ROA) as calculated by the ratio of operating profit to total assets [31]. Based on the above discussion, the following empirical model is developed:

$$ROA_{it} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 BS_{it} + \beta_3 BD_{it} + \beta_4 BI_{it} + \beta_5 FBM_{it} + \beta_3 CEOD_{it} + \beta_7 FS_{it} + \mu_{it} \ldots \text{Model (2)}$$

Where i (Company) =1,2…..147. and t=1,2… 12. The above equation has been written as per pooled OLS model.

Table 6 shows the estimates for model 2 (robustness check). Applying the fixed effect model (as suggested by the Hausman test), the results remain the same as derived in the baseline model. Nevertheless, most of the findings of the study are robust.

Table 6 Regression results

Variables	FE
BS	521.01* (0.000)
BD	425.02* (0.001)
BI	40.530* (0.002)
FBM	80.364* (0.003)
CEOD	68.777* (0.002)

FS	90.235* (0.005)
Constant	11.105 (0.320)
R^2 : Within Between Overall	0.0234 0.0058 0.0097
F-Statistic Hausman Test Wald chi2(7)	 20.590* 20.541*
N	1764

Note: * represents 1 % Level of Significance, ** represents 5 % Level of Significance and respective p values are given in parenthesis [42-50].

Discussion

The research findings provide evidence that in the context of Indian companies' larger boards and board independence are key indicators to firm performance. As per agency theory, a larger board of directors improves firm performance by allowing for better monitoring and surveillance by a large group of people thereby enhancing firm performance. In addition to this, larger boards also provide access to precious resources for the company. As a result, different directors have access to different resources, and as the number of these directors grows, resource availability grows as well, improving firm performance. Independent directors by means of effective supervision reduce agency costs leading to superior firm performance.

Apart from this, regular meetings among board members will improve decision making process of a firm, thereby leading to better performance of a firm. In addition to this, CEO duality also leads to better firm performance as separation of role between CEO and Chairman will alleviate autocratic leadership thereby enhancing firm performance. Lastly, if there is board diversity (BD), then corporate board can be managed in an efficient way thereby leading to superior firm performance [51-60].

Conclusions and Recommendations

The goal of this study is to determine the nature of the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm performance as measured by Tobin's Q (TQ), where the former is proxied by the Board Size (BS), Board Diversity (BD), Board Independence (BI), Frequency of Board Meetings (FBM), and CEO Duality (CEOD).

The findings show an affirmative and strong relationship between board size (BS) and firm performance (TQ), lending support to agency and resource dependency theory in the Indian context. In addition to this, board independence (BI) and frequency of board meetings (FBM) also appear to have a strong and positive association with firm performance. Further, CEO duality (CEOD) and board diversity (BD) bear a significant and positive association with firm performance. Regarding control variable, firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets has a positive and significance influence on firm performance [61-70].

This study adds to the existing literature on corporate governance practices and business performance by highlighting the significant impact of corporate governance practices on firm performance in India. The empirical evidence presented above demonstrates the optimal board size for improved business success. Furthermore, the study finds that board independence and more frequent board meetings benefit firm performance. Furthermore, the study shows that board diversity and CEO duality might lead to poor firm performance. As a result, this study will be useful for the Indian government and other policymakers in developing effective government policies for Indian corporations, as controlling corporate boards has become a challenging endeavor.

This study will be a valuable source of future research for academics, economists, company executives, and academics. The current study should be expanded by integrating more corporate governance components such as the Audit Committee, Remuneration Committee, and others, as well as increasing the sample size, study period, and control variables. Furthermore, additional research can be undertaken by including banking and financial organizations in the sample. Lastly, it would be interesting to see the impact of corporate governance practices on firm performance in BRICS countries and also in a developed country [71-75].

Conflict of Interest Statement

There is no conflict of interest in writing this research paper and there is no funding from other sources.

References

1. Madhani, P. (2016). Firm Size, Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices: Inter-relations. SCMS Journal of Indian Management, 13, 17-39.

2. Koji, K., Adhikary, B. K., & Tram, L. (2020). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: A Comparative Analysis between Listed Family and Non-Family Firms in Japan. J. Risk Financial Manag, 13, 215.
3. Meah, M. R., & Chaudhory, N. U. (2019). Corporate Governance and Firm's Profitability: An Emerging Economy-based Investigation. Indian Journal of Corporate Governance. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0974686219836544
4. Muhammed, A., Masood, H., & Rehana, K. (2013). Impact of Quality Corporate Governance on Firm Performance: A Ten-year Perspective. Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences, 7, 656-670.
5. Fama, E. F. (1969). The adjustment of stock prices to new information. International Economic Review, 10, 1-21.
6. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
7. Kalsie, A., & Shrivastav, S. M. (2016). Analysis of board size and firm performance: Evidence from NSE companies using panel data approach. Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 9, 148-172.
8. Khan, A., & Awan, S. H. (2012). Effect of board composition on firm's performance: A case of Pakistani listed companies. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3, 853-863.
9. Erhardt, N. L., Webel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11, 102-111.
10. Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simson, W. G. (2003). Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm Value. Financial Review, 38, 33-53.
11. Kamardin, H., & Haron, H. (2011). Roles of Board of Directors: Monitoring and Resource dependency perspectives from Malaysia. International Journal of Economics and Accounting, 2, 282-306.
12. Liang, N., & Li, J. (1999). Board structure and firm performance: New evidence from china's private firms. China Centre for Economic Research. Retrieved from https://www.ccer.edu.cn/working_paper/paper/e1999008.pdf
13. Rouf, A. (2012). The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Value of the Firm in Developing Countries: Evidence from Bangladesh. Journal of Economics and Business Research, 18, 73-85.
14. Liu, Y., Miletkov, M. K., Wei, Z., & Yang, T. (2015). Board independence and firm performance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 233-244.
15. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economics, 88, 288-307.
16. Al-Daoud, K. I., Saidin, S. Z., & Abidin, S. (2016). Board meeting and firm performance: Evidence from the Amman stock exchange. Corporate Board role duties and composition, 12, 6-11.
17. Brick, I. E., & Chidambaran, N. (2007). Board meetings, committee structure, and firm performance. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1108241
18. Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2004). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586423.
19. Francis, B., Hasan, I., & Wu, Q. (2012a). Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. SSRN Working Paper.
20. Ntim, C. G., & Osei, K. A. (2011). The impact of corporate board meetings on corporate performance in South Africa. Afr. Rev. Econ. Finance, 2, 83-103.
21. Eluyela, D. F., Akintimehin, O. O., Okere, W., Ozordi, E., Osuma, G. O., et al. (2018). Board meeting frequency and firm performance: Examining the nexus in Nigerian deposit money banks. Heliyon, 4, e00850.
22. Mangena, M., & Pike, R. (2005). The effect of audit committee shareholding, financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosure. Accounting and Business Research, 35, 327-349.
23. Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 113-142.
24. Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880.
25. Duru, A., Iyengar, R. J., & Zampelli, E. M. (2016). The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating role of board independence. Journal of Business Research, 69, 4269-4277.
26. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 543-576.
27. Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
28. Hsu, S., Lin, S.-W., Chen, W.-P., & Huang, J.-W. (2021). CEO duality, information costs, and firm performance. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 101011.
29. Pham, D. H., & Pham, Q. V. (2020). The impact of CEO duality on firm performance: Examining the life-cycle theory of Vietnam. Accounting, 6, 737-742.
30. Garg, A. K. (2007). Influence of board size and independence on firm performance: A study of Indian companies. Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers, 32, 39-60.
31. Rashid, A. (2018). Board independence and firm performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Future Business Journal, 4, 34-49.
32. Sharda, S. (2022). Determinants and Impact of Corporate Research & Development Investment on Firm Performance: Evidence from India. Orissa Journal of Commerce, 43, 65-79.
33. Arosa, B., Iturralde, T., & Maseda, A. (2013). The board structure and firm performance in SMEs: Evidence from Spain. Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa, 19, 127-135.
34. Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58, 1301-1328.
35. Akpan, E. O., & Amran, N. A. (2014). Board characteristics and company performance: Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2, 81-89.
36. Yasser, Q. R. (2012). Effects of Female Directors on Firms Performance in Pakistan. Modern Economy, 3, 817-825.
37. Foo, Y. B., & Mat Zain, M. (2010). Board independence, board diligence and liquidity in Malaysia. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 6, 92-100.

38. Cormier, D., Ledoux, M., Magnan, M., & Aerts, W. (2010). Corporate governance and information asymmetry between managers and investors. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 10, 574-589.
39. Azeez, A. A. (2015). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from Sri Lanka. Journal of Finance and Bank Management, 3, 180-189.
40. Ting, I. W. K., & Lean, H. H. (2011). Capital structure of government-linked companies in Malaysia. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting & Finance, 7, 137-156.
41. Dutta, S. R., Sen, S. S., & Mukherjee, T. (2022). Stock Liquidity and Capital Structure: Evidence from NSE Listed Top 100 Non-Finance Indian Firms. Orissa Journal of Commerce, 43, 38-54.
42. Abad, D., Lucas-Pérez, M. E., Minguez-Vera, A., & Yagüe, J. (2017). Does gender diversity on corporate boards reduce information asymmetry in equity markets? BRQ Business Research Quarterly, 20, 192-205.
43. Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291-309.
44. Ahmed, A., & Ali, S. (2017). Boardroom gender diversity and stock liquidity: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 13, 148-165.
45. Ahren, K. R., & Dittmar, A. (2012). The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 137-197.
46. Aldamen, H., Hollindale, J., & Ziegelmayer, J. L. (2018). Female audit committee members and their influence on audit fees. Accounting and Finance, 58, 57-89.
47. Al-Jaifi, H. A., Al-rassas, H., & AL-Qadasi, A. A. (2017). Corporate governance strength and stock market liquidity in Malaysia. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 13, 592-610.
48. Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal of Financial Markets, 5, 31-56.
49. Arian, O. (2014). Impact of Stock Market Liquidity on Firm Value. Journal of Educational and Management Studies, 4, 782-786.
50. Arosa, B., Iturralde, T., & Maseda, A. (2013). The board structure and firm performance in SMEs: Evidence from Spain. Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa, 19, 127-135.
51. Aspris, A., & Frino, A. (2011). Board independence, stock liquidity, and price efficiency. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1922608
52. Berardino, D. (2016). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in New Technology Ventures. Procedia Economics and Finance, 39, 412-421.
53. Cabrera-Suárez, M. K., & Martín-Santana, J. D. (2015). Board composition and performance in Spanish non-listed family firms: The influence of type of directors and CEO duality. Business Research Quaterly, 18, 213-229.
54. Che, L., & Langli, J. C. (2015). Governance Structure and Firm Performance in Private Family Firms. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2435869
55. De Andrés, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez-Iturriaga, F. (2005). Corporate Boards in OECD Countries: Size, Composition, Functioning and Effectiveness. Corporate Governance an International Review, 13, 197-210.
56. Diamond, D. W. (1985). Optimal release of information by firms. The Journal of Finance, 40, 1071-1094.
57. Gjerde, T., Mahenthiran, S., & Cademartori, D. (2013). Effect of ownership, governance, and transparency on liquidity –Chilean evidence. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 9, 183-202.
58. Goh, B. W., Ng, J., & Yong, K. O. (2012). The effect of board independence on the information environment and information asymmetry. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1267508.
59. Haque, F., Arun, T. G., & Kirkpatrick, C. (2011). Corporate governance and capital structure in developing countries: A case study of Bangladesh. Applied Economics, 43, 673-681.
60. Healy, P., Hutton, A., & Palepu, K. (1999). Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16, 485-520.
61. Jackling, B., & Johl, S. (2009). Board structure and firm performance: Evidence from India's top companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17, 492-509.
62. Jackson, M. K. (2015). Ownership, corporate governance and liquidity in Caribbean firms. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2633728.
63. Lei, Q., Lin, B., & Wei, M. (2013). Types of agency cost, corporate governance and liquidity. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 32, 147-172.
64. Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 505-527.
65. Loukil, N., Raissa, Y. W., & Yousfi, O. (2015). Gender diversity on board and stock market liquidity: Empirical evidence from the French market. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624013.66.
66. Marwa N, Aziakpono M (2015) Financial sustainability of Tanzanian saving and credit cooperatives. International Journal of Social Economics 42: 870-887.
67. Maug, E. (2002). Insider Trading Legislation and Corporate Governance. European Economic Review, 46, 1569-1597.
68. Mukherjee, T., & Sen, S. S. (2019). Impact of Corporate Governance on Corporate Sustainable Growth. International Research Journal of Business Studies, 12, 167-184.
69. Nguyen, H. T., & Muniandy, B. (2020). Gender, ethnicity and stock liquidity: Evidence from South Africa. Accounting & Finance, 61, 2337-2377.
70. Nguyen, T., Duong, H. N., & Singh, H. (2016). Stock market liquidity and firm value: An empirical examination of the Australian market. International Review of Finance, 16, 639-646.
71. Nielsen, S., & Huse, M. (2010). The Contribution of Women on Board of Directors: Goes Beyond the Surface. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18, 136-148.
72. Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependency Perspective. Harper and Row.
73. Thiruvadi, S., & Huang, H. W. (2011). Audit committee gender differences and earnings management. Gender in Management: An International Journal, 27, 366-379.

74. Welker, M. (1995). Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquidity in equity markets. Contemporary Accounting Research, 11, 801-827.

75. Ye, J., Zhang, H., Cao, C., Wei, F., & Namunyak, M. (2020). Boardroom gender diversity on stock liquidity: Empirical evidence from Chinese A-share market. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 57, 3236-3253.